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Abstract 
By constructing a system dynamics simulation platform of transmission service node pricing, this paper analyzes optimization 
principles of node pricing for power market engineering operation, and predicts effects of node pricing in Chinese power market. 
Simulation results show that under node tariff mode, the Chinese electricity market, as a whole, is running well and node price 
performs well in promoting transmission congestion management, guiding transmission expansion and selecting power and load 
location. 
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1. Introduction 
Electricity transmission services mean the process electricity delivered from power generations to users safely, 
economically and with high quality. Transmission grid is the "competition platform" of electricity transactions. The, 
grid ,balancing supply and demand of the system, guaranteeing reliability of transmission and applying efficient 
congestion management, connects power suppliers and users,  Not only a kind of business activity, the price of 
transmission, in a competitive market, offers the most important signals of stimulating production, consumption, 
investment and technology innovation by affecting return of relative parties. 
Pricing for transmission can be sorted into two levels: the conformation of payment amount and distribution of 
payment. The deciding factor for transmission service is pricing scientifically. Scientific pricing, however, is 
becoming more difficult due to technology and economic features of transmission grid, such as lumpy investment of 
transmission, economies of scale leading to difficulty of recovering cost and loop flow causing hardness of 
distribution of transmission charges. 
With deep revolution of power market, "separation of firms and grids" is realized in China. In the government 
document Electricity transmission and Distribution Price Tentative Procedures in 2005, National Development and 
Reform Commission stipulates that during the primary stage of revolution of electricity price, transmission fee 
equals average sales price minus average purchase price and transmission loss, and when bidding is applied, it 
should transfer to management way of cost plus return. The revolution of pricing of electricity transmission is at the 
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former stage and transmission charge is lack of efficient forming and distributing system and it would have great 
impact on electricity industry in China. Firstly, transmission expansion is short of sustainable motive power. 
Generation price is increasing and sales price is hard to be adjusted and these two factors could lead to narrow space 
for transmission price regulation and no compensation for grid establishment. Secondly, grid scheme, power supply 
plan and load estimation are irrelevant in some areas. The present system cannot release signals to guide location 
plan of power grid, power supply and load. 
In recent years, PJM from the USA, New York, California, New England, Australia and New Zealand is applying 
a new pricing system named node pricing, which means a node, a price. The difference between node prices is their 
transmission price. Node pricing is believed to be able to reflect scarcity degree of power in various areas and could 
offer better signals for power generations, consumers, investors and managers and this could result in short and long 
term optimal operation for power system. 
China has never experienced power market, which could be risky and establishing Chinese power market 
building by pure practice could become deformed and fall into historical repetition. It is hard to find two exact 
power markets in the world and it is unreasonable to copy the entire foreign experience. As for the historical risk, 
experiments should be operated to understand the node pricing theory and estimate its impacts on power market. 
Node pricing, however, involves power generations, consumers and transmission service providers and each 
party concerns complicated mutual influences on others which is a long process. Power system applying node 
pricing is strongly counter intuitive and the existing model is hardly able to evaluate the process clearly and fully. 
As a course dealing with non-linear, higher-order, multi-variables, multi-feedbacks, complex time-varying system, 
system dynamics fits well to do the research. 
In this paper, simulation platform, based on ssystem dynamics, is built to investigate the theory of node pricing 
optimizing power market operation and analyses effects and obstacles of node pricing in China. 
2. Literature Review 
From model World1 established by Forrester in 1971[1], system dynamics has been used in the field of energy. 
With wide spread of system dynamics and deep research of energy, system dynamics in power field is becoming 
independent gradually. 
    Roger Nail(1977) established the first comprehensive system for national energy production and consumption 
in America[2]. George Backus and Jeff Amlin(1978) developed Energy 2020 to study comprehensive long-term 
energy policy and scheme in north America and Europe[3]. Andrew Ford built CPAM(the Conservation Policy 
Analysis Model) in 1985 to analyse energy-saving policy of every states in America and established RPSM(the 
Resource Policy Screening Model) in 1990 to simulate non-public power market in America[4]. From the perspective 
of system dynamics, Christoph Grobbel(1999) studied competition of generation in German and its neighbouring 
countries[5]. Rafal Weron etc.(2003) constructed a MRJD model conerning immediate prices in power market. Karl 
Magnus Maribu(2002) built Kraftsim model[6], concentrating on development of renewable energy in liberating 
power market. There are also applications of system dynamics in Chinese power field. Jianbo Huang(2005) 
established Two-Part Tariff and generating capacity investment model[7]. 
3. Model construction 
3.1. Overall framework and basic hypotheses for the model 
x Overall framework 
At present, there are northern, central and southern channels for "power transmission from west to east" with 500 
and 220 KV. backbone architectures in China, which realizes grid connection within regions and provinces and 
cross regions. Power market in China is abstracted to western, northern and southern regional markets and named 
market 1, 2, 3 respectively. 
The simulation platform of transmission node pricing could be divided into three regional power market sub-
models and a transmission grid sub-model. Every power market possesses load and generation and every load 
decides the demands and suppliers determine the supply and investment scheme. Transmission system is the carriers 
for power transactions and every regional market are connected by network forming a united market and practice 
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market clearing. Power exchange amount for each market, local supply and load form regional market price. Due to 
effects by transmission congestion and network loss, nodal price for each regional market is various and the odds 
become transmission price. Similar to power suppliers, returns are calculated by grid companies and carry out 
transmission expansion decision. The frame diagram is showed in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1. Frame of Node Pricing Simulation Platform for Electricity Transmission Services 
 
3.2. Establishment of regional power market subsystem 
  In the model, the frameworks of the three regional markets are basically the same and therefore, only one of 
them is illustrated in this paper. 
Regional power market, concentrating on power transaction, affects power generations' investment behaviour by 
profits and works upon demands of users by costs. Based on the above-mentioned analysis, cause and effect 
feedback relation of power market could be divided to four sub-modules and it is showed in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. Causal loop diagrams of regional power market subsystem 
x Sub-module of power supply 
The quotation offered by power generations includes available electricity quantity and corresponding quotation. 
The quotation is related to market supply and demand, short-term price demand elasticity and the market power of 
generation companies. This module simplifies our country's thermal power generating set into three manufacturers: 
two oligarch manufacturers, one following manufacturer and one manufacturer containing all hydroelectric 
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generating set without utilizing of market power. Steven Stoft(2002) holds that to distinguish physical withholding 
manifestation and economical withholding manifestation is of minal effect on its influence evaluation[8]. Besides, as 
regional market, power supply also can be affected by the electricity exchange among regional power grid. 
x Sub-module of power demand 
Electric quantity price and electric capacity price together with the charges of transmission, distribution and sales 
finally form power demand side price. Because of the influence of price elasticity of demand, power price finally 
affects demands of the users. In addition, development of society should be considered, such as the increase of 
income and population, and weather can trigger obvious changes of power needs. 
x Sub-module of electricity exchange 
It is a part of transmission grid of exchange system. It is an exchange system based on transmission grid and 
shared by all regional markets. In power market, generation companies and demand side form nodal price and 
determine power companies' schedule by optimal power flow schedule. 
x Sub-module of investment 
New capacity investment and retirement of old units could also influence power supply. In this module, by 
comparing expected return rate of investment and the required capital return rate, investors can refer to the expected 
supply and demand of the market to make decisions to enlarge capacity. Calculation of profits is one of significant 
part in this module. Main income for power generations are power bills and major cost comes from operation and 
investment costs. The forming of new capacity, of course, would spend applying and constructing period, and it is 
kind of delay. 
3.3. Construction of transmission network subsystem 
Power transmission network is the carrier of power system transaction. In this module, the system operators will 
determine generated energy of each power suppliers via optimal load flow so as to form the electricity price of each 
region and decide the price of transmission. Price of generated energy and power transmission, however, also have a 
decisive effect on power suppliers and transmission enterprises.  
In this platform, transmission network consists of two sub modules. One is market exchange module, whose main 
task is to fulfill electricity trade and realize the market clearance of electric quantity and power price. It is the core of 
the entire electricity market, with which electricity market of each region is connected; the other is extended module 
of transmission network, through which the investment decision could be made by transmission billing, calculating 
income and running state, which means the calculation of utilization. 
x Sub-module of Market exchange 
DC power flow linear model with three nodes is applied in optimal power flow and electric price calculation. 
Since this is a single objective optimization problem with restrained condition, and Powersim cannot fulfill the task, 
the powerful numerical calculation ability of Matlab is needed. This paper develops a Matlab optimized operation 
function, which can realize the use of nodal price calculation in three nodes power market with random sets 
combination and compiling into COM components. By using the VBfunction of Powersim to call function 
components, the calculation of optimization scheduling and nodal price can be achieved.(Seeing Fig. 3). 
 
0$7/$%
Optimal
dispatch
function
Bidding Availablecapacity
Transmission
capacity
Total
purchase cost
Trasmission
shadow cost
Units energy
Injected net
active powerBranch flow Node price
Input:
Output:
Units number in
each node
Energy demand in
each node
Branch
reactance
 
Fig. 3. Interface of Matlab optimized dispatch function 
x Sub-module of Transmission expansion 
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Based on comparison of expected return rate of investment and the required capital return rate, network operators 
can refer to the expected supply and demand of the market, and decide the volume of transmission expansion. 
Supply and demand of the future market can be deduced by average utilization ratio of transmission liners and 
expected investment return rate can be deduced by expected power transmission income. When the average 
utilization ratio surpasses average utilization ratio defined by users, meanwhile transmission is profitable, the 
expansion of electricity can be put on the agenda. 
4. Analyses of simulation results 
Transmission grid is electricity transport carrier, as well as the trading platform of the electricity market; 
therefore, transmission service pricing must be able to reflect the main interests of the electricity market. Short-term 
interest demanding could implement effective congestion management, maintain system balance and reliability, and 
meet the market daily needs of safe operation; long-term interest demanding is able to provide location signals for 
generation and load investment, to guide the reasonable choice of location in construction of generation-side and 
demand-side to avoid aggravating the problem of transmission congestion, and provide a signal for transmission 
system investment needs when the transmission capacity is insufficient. 
4.1. The Effects of Node-Pricing on Congestion Management  
Congestion management reduces the chance of blocking through attemperring the changes in load demand by 
allocating congestion cost. If there is Congestion, the electricity price in regions with excess load will increase, 
thereby reduce energy consumption and increase generating capacity. Therefore, the effect of congestion 
management can be examined by the relative change of the effect of price on demand. 
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Fig. 4. The impact of price on demand 
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Fig. 5. Supply and demand situation of regional markets  
As it can be seen from the simulation of regional market supply and demand conditions, when facing higher real-
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time pricing, the users would consume rationally, thus reducing network congestion. In Fig. 5, the ratio of supply 
and demand is the lowest in node 3, implying that the load in node 3 is high. When blocking, the effect of electricity 
price in node 3 on demand rises sharply, thereby reducing the quantity power consumption and improving the 
relationship between supply and demand. Therefore, we can prove that the congestion management based on node-
price is effective. 
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Fig. 6. Node prices 
 
However, from Fig. 6, nodal electricity price faces large fluctuations. This is because the node-pricing law is very 
sensitive to operating conditions and network characteristics, which could induce power providers and users to bear 
congestion cost and the volatility of electricity price is too large, thereby undoubtedly the market participants are 
forced facing some market price risks. At present, people tend to take advantage of market mechanism to avoid risks 
and to solve the blocking problem through introducing transmission rights to avoid market risk and share the 
blocking surplus. 
4.2. Effect of Node Pricing on the generation capacity investment 
x Effect of Node pricing on the volatility of generation investment 
Because the factors of growth in electricity demand are also included in the change of installed capacity, the trend 
of generation investment in the market could not be reflected well. The investment behavior of the power producers 
is determined by rate of return on investment which excludes the effects of demand growth, so index ROI is better to 
reflect the fluctuation trends in market investment. 
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Fig. 7. Expected return on Investment of the power producers 
ROI curves of power producers reflect the obvious investment fluctuation. The volatility of the electricity market 
is caused by a variety of delay existing in entire electricity market. When facing rapid growth in demand and rapid 
changing in prices, construction cycle of power producers’ investment in new capacity and users’ adjustment of 
demand based on price changing both have a lag, which could make the supply and demand in the market cannot 
quickly return to the balance and cause fluctuation. 
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The cyclical boom–recession of the generating capacity does not either meet producers’ or the users’ long-term 
interest, the fluctuation has seriously affected the construction of electricity market. Simulation results show that the 
frequency and amplitude of the investment fluctuation can be reduced by shortening the corresponding periods of 
construction and approval. (Shown in Fig. 9.) 
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Fig. 8. Expected rate of return by power producers after shortening the delay 
x The effects of the node pricing on planning of the power-supply site  
The change in addressing power-supply and load can be investigated by two indicators: Power Producers’ Market 
share in regional electricity market and the change of users’ demand. Regional markets with low nodal electricity 
price, the electricity demanding will increase and installed capacity will reduce. In contrary, the market with high 
nodal electricity price, the electricity demanding will reduce and the installed capacity will increase. 
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Fig. 9. Average nodal electricity price 
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Fig. 10. Changes in market share of power producers 
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Fig. 11. Changes in consumers’ demand 
As shown in the simulation results, the electricity price in node 3 is the highest and the demand increases rapidly. 
While in node 1, the installed capacity increases rapidly. Nodal electricity price can guide power producer to invest 
in constructing the generator group in regions with higher electricity price. We can see the nodal electricity price 
reflects the real value of regional market power. 
4.3. The effect of Node Pricing on transmission expansion 
Transmission expansion is designed to eliminate network congestion, improve the quality of power supply, and 
enhance social welfare. Ultimately, this can be reflected by nodal electricity price. 
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Fig. 12.  Average nodal electricity price in each node 
As shown in Fig. 12, electricity prices in regional electricity markets are different, which means that there is 
network congestion to a certain extent. However, the difference in electricity price among each node is not large, 
showing that the congestion is not severe and the transmission pricing mechanism is efficient. Cost of market with 
absolutely no congestion is very high and no necessary. 
 
 
5. Summary 
 
Node price is very sensitive to operating conditions and network characteristics, and it could induce power 
providers and users to take expensive congestion cost and a dramatic electricity price fluctuation. At present, in 
order to avoid risks and resolve the congestion problem, people are tending to utilize market mechanism and 
introducing transmission rights to share congestion surplus. Studying operation mechanism of transmission rights, 
such as initial allocation of transmission rights, influence of transmission rights on transmission network investment 
and market power and financial transmission rights would have indispensable practical and theoretical value. 
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